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Abstract
The Supreme Court's decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District forty years
ago did for the ideal of expressive freedom in America's public schools what Brown v. Board of Education did
for the ideal of racial equality. It made a core value of the Bill of Rights spring to life for young people facing
authoritarian treatment at the hands of adult officials running their school systems. By privileging the right of
students to engage in passionate political communication over the school's interest in maintaining discipline
or the community’s interest in maintaining pro-war consensus, the Tinker decision was a decisive victory for
what Robert Post has called 'democracy' values over 'management' and 'community' values within a key
institutional setting. For its dramatic infusion of democratic speech values into a classic authoritarian
relationship - that between powerful adults and powerless children in an institutional setting - the Tinker
decision was remarkable at its inception. But the true First Amendment meaning of the decision travels well
beyond the schoolhouse gate and has yet to be recognized, much less realized.
The Tinker formula, which protects speech that does not substantially disrupt functional operations or violate
the rights of other participants, harmonizes the managerial power of democratic government to accomplish its
ends through social institutions with the cross-cutting sovereign freedom of democratic citizens to speak
inside these institutions. Tinker is the 'inside' speech correlate to the 'outside' speech principle of Brandenburg
v. Ohio, which protects all speech in the street (or elsewhere in society outside of specific institutional
contexts), that is not likely (or intended) to 'incit[e] . . . imminent lawless action.' But the striking implications
of the Tinker formula remain vastly unrealized. The freedom to speak in most social institutions is not the
default standard suspended in rare and extreme cases but rather a weak and secondary value regularly
subordinated to the foreground interests of authority, property, hierarchy, punishment and retribution,
militarism, social order, political stability, and commercial profit.
We can see how the constitutional right of free speech is constantly balanced into oblivion against weighty
social interests by the way that the school cases themselves have unfolded since Tinker was decided. Part II of
this Article examines the roots and meaning of the powerful libertarian doctrine of Tinker and then canvasses
how the doctrine has been eroded (much like the egalitarian vision of Brown) by the sharp undertow of
sympathy for authoritarian structure on the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts. The conservative Court
has carved out major exceptions to Tinker in the interests of social conformity, sexual prudishness, protection
of sensitive adults' feelings, and promotion of ideological unity for drug prohibition. Part III explores how a
traveling Tinker principle differs from the illiberal doctrines of speech regulation and suppression that govern
other institutional settings, focusing illustratively on the public sector workplace and the military. Part IV
concludes by arguing that the current weakness of the Tinker commitment undermines democratic progress
both in public schools and in other public institutions. The way to renew the momentum of the decision is to
shift rhetorical emphasis from the more manipulable 'material and substantial interference' prong of the
Tinker standard to the 'invasion of the rights of others' prong. Although consideration of the former has
tended to subsume the latter, my hope is that doctrinal focus on concrete individual rights at stake will liberate
courts from a tendency to validate abstract invocations of state interests as justifying censorship.
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“Democracy begins in conversation.” 
John Dewey1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District2 did for the ideal of expressive freedom in 
America’s public schools what Brown v. Board of Education3 did for the 
ideal of racial equality.  It made a core value of the Bill of Rights 
                                                          
 ∗  Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law.  Jamin B. 
Raskin is a professor of constitutional law and a State Senator in Maryland.  He co-
founded the Marshall-Brennan Constitutional Literacy Project, which has sent 
hundreds of law students into public high schools across America to teach about the 
Constitution.  He is the author of WE THE STUDENTS (3d ed. 2008) and OVERRULING 
DEMOCRACY:  THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (2003).   
This Article is dedicated to the grown-up Mary Beth Tinker, whose passion for 
freedom, justice, and peace remains exemplary, and to Tabitha Claire Raskin, who 
was sent to detention for courageously objecting to “silent lunch” on behalf of all of 
her classmates.   
 1. JAMES T. FARRELL ET AL., DIALOGUE ON JOHN DEWEY 58 (Corliss Lamont ed., 
1959). 
 2. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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spring to life for young people facing authoritarian treatment at the 
hands of adult officials running their school systems.4  By privileging 
the right of students to engage in passionate political communication 
over the school’s interest in maintaining discipline or the 
community’s interest in maintaining pro-war consensus, the Tinker 
decision was a decisive victory for what Robert Post has called 
“democracy” values over “management” and “community” values 
within a key institutional setting.5 
For its dramatic infusion of democratic speech values into a classic 
authoritarian relationship—that between powerful adults and 
powerless children in an institutional setting—the Tinker decision was 
remarkable at its inception.6  But the true First Amendment meaning 
of the decision travels well beyond the schoolhouse gate and has yet 
to be recognized, much less realized. 
When Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, upheld thirteen-year-
old Mary Beth Tinker’s First Amendment right to wear a black 
antiwar armband to school, he found that schools may not be 
“enclaves of totalitarianism”7 and declared institutional censorship of 
student expression invalid unless a school can demonstrate that the 
speech causes a “substantial disruption of or material interference 
with”8 the educational process or “impinge[s] upon the rights of 
other students.”9  This strict standard for reviewing censorship within 
the public school, our paradigm social institution, implies that other 
public institutions must similarly incorporate the norms of robust 
dissent and free dialogue into their own operations. 
                                                          
 4. Indeed, Kristi Bowman’s excellent contribution to this symposium 
demonstrates that, in our history, the struggle for freedom of speech for students has 
been organically intertwined with the struggle for racial justice at school.  See Kristi L. 
Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1129 
(2009). 
 5. ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS:  DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, 
MANAGEMENT 1–2 (1995) (“Three distinct forms of social order are especially 
relevant to understanding our constitutional law.  I call these community, 
management, and democracy. . . . [O]ne might say that law creates community when 
it seeks authoritatively to interpret and enforce shared mores and norms; it is 
managerial when it organizes social life instrumentally to achieve specific objectives; 
and it fosters democracy by establishing the social arrangements that carry for us the 
meaning of collective self-determination.”).  
 6. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (“School officials do not possess absolute authority 
over their students.  Students in school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under 
our Constitution.  They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must 
respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State. . . . In the 
absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their 
speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.”).  
 7. Id. at 511. 
 8. Id. at 514. 
 9. Id. at 509. 
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To be more precise, if freedom of expression is the default 
presumption at school, which is addressed to the intellectual 
upbringing of children, surely social institutions governing adults—the 
university, the workplace (public and private), the military, the 
prison, the election campaign process and political debate, the 
shopping center—must also respect the freedom of speech of citizen-
participants unless such exercise would thwart the basic purposes and 
functions of the institution.  The Tinker formula, which protects 
speech that does not substantially disrupt functional operations or 
violate the rights of other participants,10 harmonizes the managerial 
power of democratic government to accomplish its ends through 
social institutions with the cross-cutting sovereign freedom of 
democratic citizens to speak inside these institutions.  Tinker is the 
“inside” speech correlate to the “outside” speech principle of 
Brandenburg v. Ohio,11 which protects all speech in the street (or 
elsewhere in society outside of specific institutional contexts), that is 
not likely (or intended) to “incit[e] . . . imminent lawless action.”12  
But the striking implications of the Tinker formula remain vastly 
unrealized.  The freedom to speak in most social institutions is not 
the default standard suspended in rare and extreme cases but rather 
a weak and secondary value regularly subordinated to the foreground 
interests of authority, property, hierarchy, punishment and 
retribution, militarism, social order, political stability, and 
commercial profit.13  
We can see how the constitutional right of free speech is constantly 
balanced into oblivion against weighty social interests by the way that 
the school cases themselves have unfolded since Tinker was decided.  
Part II of this Article thus examines the roots and meaning of the 
powerful libertarian doctrine of Tinker and then canvasses how the 
doctrine has been eroded (much like the egalitarian vision of Brown) 
                                                          
 10. Id. at 513 (holding that a student “may express his opinions, even on 
controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without ‘materially 
and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school’ and without colliding with the rights of others” (quoting 
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)) (alteration in the original)). 
 11. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 12. Id. at 447 (striking down the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute, which 
criminalized advocacy of violence to effect political and economic change). 
 13. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988) 
(holding that school officials retained the right to censor student speech in high 
school newspapers for any reasonable pedagogical purpose).  See generally BRUCE 
BARRY, SPEECHLESS:  THE EROSION OF FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 
(2007) (criticizing employers’ broad discretion to fire workers for engaging in free 
speech that makes the employer uncomfortable even when the speech is unrelated to 
the employee’s job).  
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by the sharp undertow of sympathy for authoritarian structure on the 
Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts.  The conservative Court has 
carved out major exceptions to Tinker in the interests of social 
conformity, sexual prudishness, protection of sensitive adults’ 
feelings, and promotion of ideological unity for drug prohibition.14  
Part III explores how a traveling Tinker principle differs from the 
illiberal doctrines of speech regulation and suppression that govern 
other institutional settings, focusing illustratively on the public sector 
workplace and the military.  Part IV concludes by arguing that the 
current weakness of the Tinker commitment undermines democratic 
progress both in public schools and in other public institutions.  The 
way to renew the momentum of the decision is to shift rhetorical 
emphasis from the more manipulable “material and substantial 
interference” prong of the Tinker standard to the “invasion of the 
rights of others” prong.15  Although consideration of the former has 
tended to subsume the latter, my hope is that doctrinal focus on 
concrete individual rights at stake will liberate courts from a tendency 
to validate abstract invocations of state interests as justifying 
censorship.   
II. EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY:  THE TRIUMPH OF TINKER  
The Tinker decision marked an historic triumph for intellectual 
freedom at school.  Justice Abe Fortas insisted that the case could not 
be decided simply by roping off institutions of public education from 
the force field of the Bill of Rights.  He wrote: “It can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”16  
In addressing this threshold question of the constitutional status of 
people entering public schools, Justice Fortas fortunately did not 
write on a blank blackboard.  For even before Tinker gave students 
the right to speak their conscience at school, another great wartime 
school speech decision, West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette,17 had given them the right not to have to speak against 
                                                          
 14. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (holding 
that the school district did not violate a student’s First Amendment rights when it 
suspended him for using lewd language during a school assembly, given that “it is a 
highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar 
and offensive terms in public discourse”); see also Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 
2625 (2007) (holding that a high school principal did not violate a student’s right to 
free speech when she confiscated his “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner at an off-
campus, school-sanctioned event). 
 15. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511, 513.  
 16. Id. at 506. 
 17. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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conscience at school.  This decision created the framework for Tinker 
by establishing the First Amendment rights of students at school as an 
important component of democratic freedom under the 
Constitution.18  
The Barnette children were Jehovah’s Witnesses who refused for 
religious reasons to pledge allegiance to the flag at school.19  It took 
unknown courage for them to sit it out in small-town West Virginia in 
the middle of World War II.  The Supreme Court in Minersville School 
District v. Gobitis20 had just three years prior rejected a First 
Amendment attack on the pledge salute, and Witnesses across the 
country were facing official reprisals and vigilante harassment for 
their refusal to join in.21 
But Justice Robert Jackson came to their aid, writing the Supreme 
Court’s first great student rights decision and, in the process, 
defining the anti-authoritarian premises of American democracy with 
more clarity than any Supreme Court justice had ever done.  Taken 
seriously, his words make the First Amendment the guardian of the 
people’s sovereignty over both their own minds and their own 
government:  
There is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or of 
the nature or origin of its authority.  We set up government by 
consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in 
power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent.  Authority here 
is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by 
authority.22  
 If public opinion controls government, the Free Speech Clause 
operates like a secular anti-establishment clause, heading off at every 
turn establishment of political and ideological orthodoxy.  The 
citizenry must be sovereign over its own consciousness.  In Justice 
                                                          
 18. Id. at 642 (invalidating a West Virginia Board of Education resolution 
requiring all school children to salute the American flag and recite the Pledge of 
Allegiance as a violation of the First Amendment). 
 19. Id. at 629 (explaining that Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse to salute the flag 
because they consider it a “graven image,” whose worship is proscribed in Exodus 
20:4–5). 
 20. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624 (1943). 
 21. For a fascinating and important discussion of how the Court reversed itself 
and moved from the authoritarian premises of  Gobitis to the libertarian premises of 
Barnette in three years during World War II—with a crucial push from President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt—see Robert L. Tsai, Reconsidering Gobitis:  An Exercise in 
Presidential Leadership, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 363, 382 (2008) (arguing that Roosevelt 
placed rhetorical pressure on the Court to change its mind as freedom of 
conscience, thought, and worship were essential to defining the American position in 
the war against Nazism and fascism). 
 22. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641. 
  
1198 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1193 
Jackson’s now immortal words: “If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act 
their faith therein.”23  Thus, in democracy, the citizen occupies the 
highest office in the land, and public officials are public servants who 
cannot dictate political dogma to their masters: the people.  This 
framing sets the table for understanding the presumptive sovereign 
free speech rights of the people as they move, work and act in every 
social institution. 
Yet as important as Barnette was, it was Tinker that actually 
proclaimed the right of America’s children to speak out at school.  
After all, the Jehovah’s Witnesses were religionists minding their own 
business and wanted only to be left alone; they were playing defense.  
But angelic-looking Mary Beth Tinker was an outspoken American 
rebel from the heartland, a precocious free spirit directly challenging 
in wartime the authority of the President, the military-industrial 
complex, and her school principal, who had gotten wind of her 
protest and hastily promulgated a rule banning black armbands.24  
But Mary Beth, joined by her brother John and their friend Chris 
Eckhardt, insisted on expressing solidarity for Senator Robert 
Kennedy’s call for a Christmas truce in Vietnam.25  Defiant, she wore 
her black armband to school on December 16, 1965, making it to 
third period before she was sent down the hall.26  She refused to 
remove the armband and was suspended.27  Her family received death 
threats and had red paint splashed on their front door.28  But the 
Tinkers hung tough and, with the help of the American Civil 
Liberties Union, took their case to the Supreme Court. 
                                                          
 23. Id. at 642. 
 24. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) 
(stating that, upon learning of petitioners’ plans to wear black armbands from 
December 16 through New Year’s Day to publicize their objection to the Vietnam 
War, the principals of the Des Moines schools met and instituted a ban on armbands 
on December 14).  
 25. Mary Beth Tinker, I Could Not Sit By and Watch This Happening (May 6,  
1992), available at http://www.rightsmatter.org/multimedia/personal_stories/mary_ 
beth_tinker.html. 
 26. Id. (“After lunch I went to algebra and my teacher was waiting at the door.  
He told me to go to the office.  At the office, I was suspended and went home.”). 
 27. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504 (stating that the students, who were suspended until 
they agreed to remove their armbands, only returned to school after the planned 
period for wearing armbands had expired—New Year’s Day).  
 28. Alice Ollstein, Off the Cuff:  First Amendment Activist Mary Beth Tinker, OBERLIN 
REV., May 9, 2008, http://www.oberlin.edu/cgi-bin/cgiwrap/ocreview/20080509. 
php?a=n_off_the&sec=news (describing the community’s reaction to Tinker’s protest 
and subsequent lawsuit). 
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At stake in Tinker, according to the school district, was nothing less 
than every school principal’s power to maintain order against the 
anarchy threatened by children exercising political speech rights.29  
The argument, again in Robert Post’s terms, depended on the 
assertion of official state “management” interests over the discursive 
and interactive values of “democracy.”30  
But Justice Fortas perceived the infinitely elastic nature of this 
argument and declared that schools can never censor out of a “mere 
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”31  Rather, a school seeking to 
censor must show that a student’s speech will “materially and 
substantially interfere[] with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school,”32 which means “material[] 
disrupt[ion of] classwork or . . . substantial disorder or invasion of the 
rights of others.”33  This standard creates the “inside” correlate to the 
“outside” principle of Brandenburg v. Ohio, which was decided also by 
the Court in 1969 and protects all speech in the street (or elsewhere 
in the society outside of specific institutional contexts) that is not 
intended and likely to “incit[e] . . . imminent lawless action.”34  The 
decisions are congruent since the larger society can repress speech 
only if it seriously and imminently threatens the legal order itself, and 
an institution within society can repress speech only if it seriously and 
imminently threatens the essential functions of the institution as set 
forth in law and policy. 
Needless to say, Mary Beth’s principal asserted that her black 
armband was disruptive.  But Justice Fortas found that, under the 
First Amendment, schools may not simply equate dissent with 
disruption.  “In our system,” he wrote, “state-operated schools may 
not be enclaves of totalitarianism,” and “students may not be 
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State 
chooses to communicate.  They may not be confined to the expression of 
those sentiments that are officially approved.”35  Rather, a school must have 
                                                          
 29. Brief for Respondents at 33, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503 (1969) (No. 21), 1968 WL 112603 (“No one can accurately judge what 
might have happened if the school administration had not acted so swiftly.  There 
have been enough other similar demonstrations in schools, particularly in the 
colleges, that the Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the consequences 
could have been serious if the demonstration had not been stopped almost before it 
got started.”). 
 30. See POST, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
 31. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
 32. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 33. Id. at 513. 
 34. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).  
 35. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (emphasis added). 
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a compelling reason for silencing students, and “undifferentiated fear 
or apprehension of disturbance” can never be “enough to overcome 
the right to freedom of expression.”36  
Significantly, the Court’s sweeping analysis advanced not only a 
constitutional theory of democratic rights but a democratic theory of 
education.  Mary Beth was not to be the “closed-circuit” recipient of 
information drilled into her mind by the school board.  As a student, 
she must be treated as an active and responsive participant in the 
learning process.  Education is not something that the school system 
does to the student.  It is what takes place when the community forms 
and investigates different facets of the world.  Each student has 
something precious to offer the rest of the class and 
“intercommunication among the students” is not only “inevitable” 
but “an important part of the educational process.”37  Indeed, the free 
exchange of thoughts and feelings among students “is not confined 
to the supervised and ordained discussion which takes place in the 
classroom,” but spills over to the whole school day, including athletic, 
extracurricular, and informal events.38  This analysis suggests that 
Mary Beth could not be punished either for something controversial 
she said in class discussion, or for something she said in the 
interstices of the official school day when students are enjoying “free 
time.”  
This subtle rendering of the school experience in democratic 
society closely resembles the thinking of John Dewey, who argued 
that students learn equally from the “formal” curriculum and the 
“informal” curriculum generated in the nooks and crannies of the 
school day, where banter, jokes, talk of current events, laughter, 
gossip, interaction with teachers, and the full play of social life 
acquaint students with cultural values and political ideas.39   
Far from disrupting the overall educational process, Mary Beth’s 
silent but spirited protest enriched it.  A good teacher would have 
noted her armband and moved on or even picked up on it to teach 
about anything from war powers to post-World War II American 
foreign policy, to free speech itself.  But there was no constitutional 
                                                          
 36. Id. at 508. 
 37. Id. at 512.  
 38. Id. 
 39. See JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION:  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 26, 212 (1922) (arguing that informal education “gives a 
clew to the understanding of the subject matter of formal or deliberate instruction” 
and that “[t]he development within the young of the attitudes and dispositions 
necessary to the continuous and progressive life of a society cannot take place by 
direct conveyance of beliefs, emotions, and knowledge. It takes place through the 
intermediary of the environment.”). 
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reason to fear her expression because there is no educational reason 
to fear blurring the boundaries between school and the outside 
world.  The boundaries are porous and, as Dewey put it, “learning in 
school should be continuous with that out of school.”40  Rather than 
punishing Mary Beth’s activism, the school ought to have welcomed 
it.  Dewey wrote: “A progressive society counts individual variations as 
precious since it finds in them the means of its own growth.”41  The 
important thing is not that all students agree or even that they all feel 
comfortable at all times, but rather that they all feel empowered to 
think, act and speak for themselves: “[a]ll education which develops 
power to share effectively in social life is moral.”42  Mary Beth’s 
principal and teacher lacked the proper sense of democratic 
improvisation in the learning process.   
In following decades, the awesome libertarian spirit of Tinker 
helped move the Court to forbid the removal of books from school 
libraries for political reasons43 and to protect the free speech rights of 
religious groups obtaining equal access to school facilities after 
hours.44  It also began to shift attitudes about student speech in lower 
courts and many school systems and prompted some states, like 
Arkansas, to codify the Tinker standard in state law.45 
A. The Undertow of Institutional Authoritarianism 
But the Court’s hard turn to the right over the years caused it to 
reverse course in significant ways.  It has carved out meaty exceptions 
to the Tinker rule, authorizing school censorship in the context of 
“lewd and indecent” student speech (Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser);46 in the context of any “school-sponsored” student speech in 
newspapers, yearbooks, assemblies, theater productions, and other 
outlets that “the public might reasonably perceive to bear the 
imprimatur of the school” (Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier);47 
and, most recently, in the case of student speech that might be 
                                                          
 40. Id. at 416. 
 41. Id. at 357.  
 42. Id. at 418. 
 43. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 
872 (1982) (invalidating the removal of books from a public school library based on 
a hit-list of putatively vulgar and offensive works).  
 44. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001) (holding the 
school district’s exclusion of certain church groups from using school facilities 
constituted viewpoint discrimination).  
 45. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-1204 (2007). 
 46. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 47. 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
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“reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use” (Morse v. 
Frederick).48  
The reasoning of the majority decisions in these cases is 
embarrassingly literal-minded.  In Fraser, the Court drew up the lewd 
and indecent speech exception to uphold suspension and other 
discipline of a mischievous student at Bethel High School in Pierce 
County, Washington, who gave a nominating speech for a fellow 
student running for student government based on—surprise, 
surprise!—a sophomoric sexual metaphor.  He said, “I know a man 
who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character 
is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is 
firm.”49  Surely the teacher supervising might have rolled his or her 
eyes and spoken disapprovingly of wasting the opportunity on such a 
vacuous statement.  But suspension—for what?  Are not 
Shakespeare’s plays—The Taming of the Shrew and Twelfth Night come 
quickly to mind—filled with sexual metaphors, sneaky double 
entendres, and bawdy insinuations?  Of course, the teenaged culprit 
was no Shakespeare in his little riff, but surely a nimble principal 
could have told Fraser publically to channel his rudimentary comic 
instincts into literature rather than politics, where such speeches do 
not fare very well.  This would have been a fair, stern, and 
educationally meaningful intervention. 
But the principal ordered, and the Court affirmed, Fraser’s 
suspension and other punishment.50  If the Court had to go in that 
direction, Justice William Brennan, in his concurring opinion, 
offered the right way to justify it.  There was no reason to carve out a 
separate category for lewd and indecent speech, he argued, since 
Fraser’s speech had arguably “substantially disrupted” the school’s 
pedagogical mission to teach mature public advocacy.51  At the very 
most, then, Tinker should have been applied, not shoved aside.  
All in all, the Fraser case was not a catastrophe, but heavy frontal 
damage was inflicted on Tinker in the Hazelwood decision.  There, 
Principal Robert Reynolds censored two articles, written by students 
for their school newspaper and approved by the teacher of the 
journalism class.52  One article concerned the impact of parental 
divorce on students and the other was about the problem of teen 
pregnancy as seen through the experiences of three pregnant 
                                                          
 48. 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625 (2007). 
 49. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
 50. Id. at 685 (majority opinion). 
 51. Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 52. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262. 
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students.53  Under Tinker and Fraser, the articles were plainly 
protected speech and neither disruptive, lewd nor indecent.  Indeed, 
they were written in a mature and thoughtful way about serious 
problems much on the mind of the student body.  But the principal 
thought that the discussions of sex and birth control in the latter 
story were “inappropriate for some of the younger students”54 and 
that the former story was unbalanced and might invite controversy.55  
The Court majority found that, while Tinker governs the voluntary 
independent speech of students, greater latitude must be granted to 
educators to exercise “editorial control over the style and content of 
student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as 
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”56  It promptly found Reynold’s censorship of the 
newspaper articles reasonable and not based on viewpoint 
discrimination.57  This decision prepares young journalists to be not 
only edited by editors but squelched by puritans in power. 
The dissenting justices—William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, 
and Harry Blackmun—rallied around the forsaken virtues of Tinker, 
observing that the school’s journalism class had itself committed to 
publishing all articles that do not “materially and substantially 
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline.”58  (It is 
indeed instructive to observe that this school, doubtless like many 
others, quickly embraced and adopted the intuitive free speech 
formula of Tinker after the decision was handed down.)   
  The dissenters insisted that mere political disagreement between 
students and administration should never be sufficient grounds for 
censoring speech in a school publication.59  After all, principals do 
not own their schools and school publications belong to the school 
community itself, which is governed as a state actor by the First 
Amendment. 
Of course, educators can require students to learn the contents of 
a course, but this truism is “the essence of the Tinker test, not an 
excuse to abandon it,” as the dissenters insisted.60  They agreed that 
high schools do not have to publish student articles that are 
“ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or 
                                                          
 53. Id. at 263. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 273.  
 57. Id. at 274. 
 58. Id. at 278. 
 59. Id. at 280 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. at 283. 
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prejudiced”61 but pointed out that “we need not abandon Tinker to 
reach that conclusion; we need only apply it.”62  What is crucial is that 
school officials cannot act as political “‘thought police[,]’ stifling 
discussion of all but state-approved topics and advocacy of all but the 
official position.”63  If the school principal found fault with the 
articles about teen pregnancy and the meaning of divorce for kids, he 
had every right in the final analysis to print an institutional disclaimer 
or publish opposing views.  But he chose to censor instead.  
The Hazelwood decision silently revived the old private property-
based conception of speech rights on public lands, which defined the 
pre-history of the modern First Amendment.  Before the landmark 
“public forum” cases of the 1930s, like Schneider v. Irvington64 and 
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,65 declared that the 
people must have free access to streets, sidewalks, and parks to 
engage in speech and protest, the constitutional doctrine held that 
managers of public property were like private property owners.  In 
1897, the Supreme Court in Davis v. Massachusetts66 had ruled that the 
officers of a municipal corporation, such as Boston, could arbitrarily 
exclude disfavored speech from public areas like Boston Common.67  
Mayors were treated like owners and bosses.  Under Hazelwood, 
principals enjoy much of the same kind of unbridled power.  
Formally, they cannot discriminate against speech based on political 
viewpoint, but in reality, they enjoy awesome sway to regulate political 
communication.  
After Hazelwood, the Court’s 2007 decision in Morse seemed 
depressingly predictable, as the Court again exfoliated vast acres of 
free expression to kill the mosquito of adolescent humor.  The 
student culprit in the case, Joseph Frederick, was a high school senior 
in Juneau, Alaska, who used the occasion of the Olympic torch relay 
to make a bid for national television coverage by unfurling a banner 
bearing the phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”68  The majority upheld his 
                                                          
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 283–84. 
 63. Id. at 285–86. 
 64. 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (rejecting the argument that the city’s interest in 
keeping streets clean overrides an individual’s right to hand literature to those who 
would receive it).  
 65. 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939) (stating that a citizen’s right to use streets and 
parks for communication of views regarding national issues may be regulated but not 
abridged or denied). 
 66. 167 U.S. 43 (1897). 
 67. Id. at 47. 
 68. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007). 
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ten-day suspension based on a new doctrine, withdrawing First 
Amendment protection for speech advocating illegal drug use.69 
It is tempting to dismiss the importance of a case based on such 
frivolous events but Stevens’s lucid dissenting opinion points out the 
dramatic change effected by the majority in the Morse decision.  By 
approving “stark” efforts to suppress one side of the national debate 
about drugs, the new exception to Tinker discards the Court’s prior 
commitment to maintaining official viewpoint neutrality at school.70  
Furthermore, the Court dropped Tinker’s understanding that a 
censoring school must show an imminent substantial disruption.  
Frederick’s “nonsense message”71 posed no threat of any kind, much 
less a threat of immediate substantial disruption.  The likely effect of 
his silly slogan was plainly nothing.  As Stevens memorably put it:  
“Most students . . . do not shed their brains at the schoolhouse gate, 
and most students know dumb advocacy when they see it.”72  
The broader consequence, Stevens observed, is a severe chill 
placed on student speech questioning the war on drugs.73  This is a 
chill we can ill afford, he pointed out, as free debate was the catalyst 
for changing the disastrous policies of the Vietnam War and—even 
more on point—Prohibition.74  Given the mounting costs and 
casualties of drug prohibition, Stevens warned against “silencing 
opponents of the war on drugs” and stated that, in “the national 
debate about a serious issue, it is the expression of the minority’s 
viewpoint that most demands the protection of the First 
Amendment.”75  Here Stevens identified the freedom to dissent at 
school with the freedom to dissent in the society at large.  It is a 
linkage that we must insist upon not only because of the central 
symbolic importance of school to understanding the broader 
dynamics of participation in society, but because school is the 
training ground for actual citizenship. 
The staged retreat of the Court from Tinker has restored the 
presumptive power of school authorities to censor, placing student 
free speech rights in a straitjacket.  The combined effect of the Fraser, 
Hazelwood, and Morse decisions is to give schools censoring authority 
when student speech is arguably sexual, indecent or inappropriate in 
nature; when it risks offending any parents or any students; when it 
                                                          
 69. Id. at 2629. 
 70. Id. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 71. Id. at 2649. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 2651. 
 74. Id. at 2650–51. 
 75. Id. at 2651. 
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seemingly implicates the name or authority of the school or one of its 
activities; and when it is even jokingly questioning or non-judgmental 
of drug prohibition or other prevailing social or legal taboos. 
These various blows against Tinker have led to accelerating 
censorship of school newspapers, yearbooks, magazines, and 
theatrical productions around the country, as well as stepped up 
discipline of students who inject “inappropriate” language into the 
school environment.76  Many administrators now view themselves like 
private shopping mall owners, most of whom (depending on which 
state they operate in) get to control who says what, when and where 
on their premises.77  Of course, even when Tinker was riding high, its 
sweeping message did not penetrate all public schools, and its spirit 
was often honored in the breach.  Constitutional literacy exists at 
alarmingly low levels in the country, and, despite the noble and 
intensifying efforts of the Marshall-Brennan Constitutional Literacy 
Project and the long-standing work of Street Law,78 precious few high 
school students know what their First Amendment rights are, much 
less how to fight for them or where to go for help.  (Despite Engel v. 
                                                          
 76. The Student Press Law Center website has meticulously documented the 
growing threat to student free speech and free press in the wake of these decisions.  
For a continuing roundup of the fallout, see http://www.splc.org.  
 77. The Supreme Court found in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 519–21 (1976), 
that citizens in shopping malls have no First Amendment right to engage in political 
speech, confining to its narrow facts the Court’s libertarian holding in Marsh v. 
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).  In Marsh, the Court held that privately owned 
“company towns” must permit First Amendment activity if they have invited the 
public onto the property.  Marsh, 326 U.S. at 509.   
Several state courts have found free speech rights under state constitutional law for 
citizens to petition and proselytize in shopping centers.  See, e.g., N.J. Coal. Against 
War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 760 (N.J. 1994) (finding, 
however, that shopping centers may set “reasonable conditions” for such activity).  
For a discussion of the fascinating line of shopping mall cases, see JAMIN B. RASKIN, 
OVERRULING DEMOCRACY:  THE SUPREME COURT VERSUS THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 174–79 
(2003).  
 78. The Marshall-Brennan Constitutional Literacy Project, headquartered at 
American University’s Washington College of Law and founded in 1999, now 
operates at numerous law schools, including Arizona State University Law School, 
Drexel Law School, Howard Law School, Northeastern Law School, Rutgers Law 
School, UC Berkeley Law School, the University of Louisville Law School, the 
University of Oregon Law School, the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 
Southern Law School, and Yale Law School.  With the indispensable help of Mary 
Beth Tinker herself, the Project sends law students who have done well in 
constitutional law into public high schools to teach a full-blown semester-long course 
in “constitutional literacy,” focused on all of the Supreme Court decisions that affect 
students directly, beginning with the Tinker case.  The Street Law Program, which was 
launched in 1972 at Georgetown University to teach high school students about their 
criminal procedure rights in dealing with police and the criminal justice system, also 
has a presence on many campuses.  
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Vitale,79 Lee v. Weisman,80 and other cases rejecting official prayer in 
school contexts, I still frequently meet students who have been asked 
to pray together at school, on the football field, or at graduation.)  
Yet Tinker is still good law within its chiseled-down space.  If its 
judicial enemies have managed to place it in a straitjacket, they have 
failed to give it the guillotine, and it has probably reached 
entrenched and iconic cultural status, something like Miranda v. 
Arizona,81 such that a direct overruling is unlikely.82  Of course, this 
does not mean that there are not jurists and academics still calling for 
its head.  In his startlingly atavistic concurring opinion in Morse, 
Justice Clarence Thomas unabashedly tried to refute the idea that 
students have First Amendment rights and cited approvingly cases 
from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in which state courts 
upheld severe discipline, including corporal punishment, against 
students simply for speaking against their masters.83  One case he 
invoked, Wooster v. Sunderland,84 was a California appeals decision 
affirming expulsion of a student for criticizing unsafe conditions at 
his school that added up to what he saw as a significant fire hazard.85 
Nonetheless, the irony is that, while Tinker has been battered 
internally in the field of education, its core meaning is more 
compelling and relevant than ever outside of the school context.  
Although Tinker’s wings have been clipped, the erosion of speech 
rights in other institutional contexts means that now is precisely the 
time for the Tinker principle to take flight.  
III. ENCLAVES OF FREEDOM:  THE PROMISE OF TINKER 
There is a vigorous academic and judicial discourse about the 
extent to which First Amendment protection should differ according 
to the institutional context in which speech takes place.86  The 
                                                          
 79. 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (finding that the New York school system’s 
compelled recitation of the Regent’s Prayer was wholly inconsistent with the 
Establishment Clause).  
 80. 505 U.S. 577, 595–96 (1992) (rejecting the state’s argument that a prayer at 
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 81. 396 U.S. 868 (1969). 
 82. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000) (“Miranda has 
become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have 
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 83. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2630–33 (2007). 
 84. 148 P. 959 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1915). 
 85. Id. at 960–61.  
 86. Compare Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. 
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Supreme Court has derived many different tests regarding the 
protection of speech in various institutions, all of them balancing the 
presumptively compelling interests of the institution—the public 
employer, the military, the prison, the corporation, for example—
against the reduced speech interests of the citizen now operating in a 
specific subordinate social role in the institution—the public 
employee, the soldier, the prisoner, or the consumer/worker, to take 
several important cases.  These balancing tests tilt heavily against 
individual speech from the start and almost always defeat the 
individual’s claim against institutional censorship and control. 
A. Public Employees Speaking Out  
The Tinker analysis cuts though the morass of specific institutional 
speech tests and sets straight the frameworks of analysis which are so 
slanted and distorted.  If we think about the common occurrence of a 
public employee speaking against this or that government policy and 
then being disciplined for it, the Tinker analysis offers a clean 
solution.  If the public employee is outside of the work context and 
objects to a public policy, even one developed by the government 
agency or office she works for, the speech cannot be sanctioned 
because the employee is a complete rights-bearing citizen, whose 
political speech receives full and equal First Amendment protection.  
The government should have no more power to retaliate against that 
employee-citizen than a school has to retaliate against a student who, 
from an off-campus location, criticizes his or her school. 
The trickier case is the public employee whose at-work political 
speech or policy critique is considered offensive or disruptive by her 
employer and is punished for it.  Here, the Tinker analysis reminds us 
                                                          
Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1639 (2007) (pointing out that Schauer 
ignores the fact that courts actually “tailor too much” in certain institutions, chiefly 
schools, workplaces and prisons; rejecting arguments for institutional doctrinal 
tailoring based on theories of individual waiver or the costs of risk and error; and 
arguing for an intermediate level of scrutiny in these settings).  The most 
authoritative treatment of the subject is Robert Post’s lucid work Constitutional 
Domains, which argues that the law partitions “the social world among different forms 
of social order,” which he calls management, community and democracy, in order to 
regulate behavior and that First Amendment jurisprudence “divides social life into” 
these “discrete domains” as well.  POST, supra note 5, at 2–3.   However, the helpful 
image of law partitioning social life into different domains may be overdrawn when it 
comes to specific institutions since these categories may be more usefully seen as 
competing values within institutions that appear and reappear in different 
proportions in different contexts.  A school is neither just a managerial instrument of 
public policy nor just a manifestation of community values nor just a domain of 
collective and individual democracy, but a mixture of all three.  The genius of Tinker 
was to find that the democratic imperative could not be obviated unless it actually 
thwarted the other two values.  
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that the public employee is still—irreducibly and commendably—a 
citizen, a member of the broader sovereign community empowered 
and invited to contribute to public discourse.  The employee’s 
supervisors cannot punish her simply because they are made to feel 
“uncomfortable” or defensive by her speech.  That is the pointed 
message of Tinker: a citizen’s speech may not be suppressed by an 
institution out of a “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”87  
The public employer that seeks to censor must rather show, 
according to the Tinker framework, that the employee’s speech will 
“materially and substantially” interfere with the work of the 
government agency or invade “the rights of others.”88 
In essence, the employee can be punished for her speech only if it 
literally keeps her from doing her job or thwarts the operations of the 
institution.  Thus, a uniformed police officer cannot walk off duty to 
go make speeches at public rallies about sexism on the police force.  
This is not because she is forbidden to have opinions about the police 
force, but rather because she is needed, and contractually obligated, 
at that point to be at work.  But surely she should be able to use her 
day off to go make such a speech (in plain clothes), even if her 
superiors disagree with it.  Similarly, if she writes an internal office 
memorandum about why she thinks a particular police action 
violated the constitutional rights of suspects, her superiors do not 
have to follow her advice to dismiss charges, but surely they cannot 
retaliate against her for expressing, in professional good faith, a 
different point of view.  The institution’s mission must integrate 
flexibly the principles of democratic dialogue and internal dissent 
that flow from the First Amendment, and an “undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance” can never be “enough to overcome the 
right to freedom of expression.”89  
When we compare this Tinker-informed approach to actual First 
Amendment doctrine controlling the field of public employee 
speech, we find the latter seriously deficient and disappointing.  The 
most recent Supreme Court decision, Garcetti v. Ceballos,90 involved a 
deputy district attorney who wrote an office disposition 
memorandum expressing grave reservations about falsehoods 
contained in a police affidavit that was used to obtain a criminal 
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 88. Id. at 513. 
 89. Id. at 508. 
 90. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
  
1210 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1193 
search warrant.91  In the memorandum, he recommended dismissal 
of the case.92  For his strong position, the employee suffered a series 
of retaliatory adverse job actions.93  When he sued, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld his claim, finding that 
the subject matter of his memorandum was “inherently a matter of 
public concern”94 within the meaning of the Court’s prior decision in 
Pickering v. Board of Education.95  Having determined that the memo 
met the public-concern criterion, the Ninth Circuit balanced 
Ceballos’s speech interests against the District Attorney’s interest in 
punishing it.96  It decided in Ceballos’s favor because the District 
Attorney “failed even to suggest disruption or inefficiency in the 
workings of the District Attorney’s Office” as a consequence of the 
position he took in the memo.97  The managers simply disapproved of 
what he was saying.  Under Tinker, this is an easy and intuitive result. 
But the Supreme Court majority, with Justice Anthony Kennedy 
writing, promptly reversed.  It determined first that Ceballos was not 
speaking as a citizen on public matters.98  If he had been, even that 
fact would not have been dispositive according to the Court because 
it found that public employees speaking as citizens on public matters 
still have to face “those speech restrictions that are necessary for their 
employers to operate efficiently and effectively,”99 a loose standard 
that swallows up a lot of what should be absolutely protected political 
speech in civil society.  
In any event, Justice Kennedy found that Ceballos was speaking 
only as an employee executing his public duties, not as a citizen on a 
public issue, and “when public employees make statements pursuant 
to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for 
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate 
                                                          
 91. Id. at 414. 
 92. Id.  
 93. See id. at 415 (describing alleged retaliations such as position reassignment, 
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their communications from employer discipline.”100  The majority 
thus bifurcated the analysis, finding that public employees speaking 
as citizens have some measure of rights left to be balanced against the 
public employer’s interest but that public employees speaking in the 
line of duty have none whatsoever and can presumptively be 
punished for their views.101 
This whole approach capsizes Tinker.  After all, Justice Fortas’s 
opinion began by declaring that neither students nor teachers shed 
their First Amendment rights at the schoolhouse gate, thereby 
implying that those rights exist in full for students and teachers before 
they enter the schoolhouse gate. Justice Fortas never would have 
implied, much less found, that a student outside of school must have 
his First Amendment rights subjected to “those speech restrictions 
that are necessary” for his school “to operate efficiently and 
effectively,” a giant and dangerously plastic standard.102  Indeed, at 
that point, students or public employees would have their First 
Amendment rights subjected to a statist balancing operation 
wherever and whenever they speak on public things.  According to 
this approach, students and (especially) teachers would be shedding 
their First Amendment rights before they ever get to school.  
More to the point, the basic meaning of the Tinker decision was 
that a student at school is still a citizen clothed with constitutional 
rights that she does not surrender simply because she is in a learning 
relationship with teachers paid by the government.  Yet, Justice 
Kennedy essentially finds that a public employee does shed his First 
Amendment rights entering the gates of the government workplace.  
That cannot be right; it confuses the legitimate expectations that the 
government has in getting employees to do their work with the 
citizen-employee’s total sacrifice of the free speech rights constitutive 
of democratic citizenship.  Surely it is legitimate to prevent a math 
teacher from using class time to propagandize against the president 
of the school board or of the United States because class time (except 
perhaps for a few minutes of “warm-up”) is for discussion of class 
material.  But a math teacher should never be punished for speaking 
outside of school, or within school in an appropriate context, in a way 
that is critical of government authority.  For example, a teacher who 
objects at a staff meeting to a new course schedule cannot be 
punished simply for disagreeing with the principal.  Yet, according to 
Justice Kennedy, even if the positions she takes are in the line of duty, 
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are in good faith, and threaten no institutional disruption, her 
employer can still punish her for dissenting simply because she is 
acting as an “employee” and not a “citizen.”  This is workplace 
authoritarianism pure and simple. 
The majority’s interpretation undermines the breadth and 
complexity of democratic citizenship.  The word “employee” defines 
one of the crucial roles played by most every democratic citizen, not a 
category of disembodied servants outside of the processes of 
constitutional sovereignty and government.  As Justice Stevens 
observes in dissent, “public employees are still citizens while they are 
in the office.  The notion that there is a categorical difference 
between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the course of one’s 
employment is quite wrong.”103   
In his dissenting opinion in Ceballos, Justice Souter also makes this 
crucial point, but the standard that he offers for deciding whether 
work-related speech is protected by the First Amendment is itself 
exceedingly stingy towards expression and seems makeshift and 
unprincipled.  He argues that the government can punish an 
employee’s speech unless the employee (1) “speaks on a matter of 
unusual importance,” and (2) “satisfies high standards of 
responsibility in the way he does it.”104  He suggests that “only 
comment on official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, 
other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety can weigh 
out in an employee’s favor.”105  
This puzzling standard creates content-based hurdles for the 
employee to clear and shifts the burden back to her to show that she 
has acted in an extremely responsible way to talk about unusually 
important things.  Even if we knew what these words meant, the 
standard itself fundamentally betrays the First Amendment, whose 
coverage, we know from Tinker, properly extends to any topic or 
subject and which allows anyone to take any position they want.  If a 
public employee is meeting all her professional responsibilities and 
getting her job done, by what right does the state punish her for her 
views and demand that she make an extraordinary justification for 
them?   
The only issue that should be in play is this: whether the 
employee’s “civic” speech at work is either preventing her from 
completing her basic work assignments and duties, or is 
fundamentally thwarting the ability of the agency, as a whole, to 
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accomplish its democratically validated institutional goals and 
mission.  Short of either of those difficult proofs, the state must 
accept the individual expression of employees as a cost—and in truth, 
what is often more likely, a great benefit—of having a public 
workplace in a pluralist democracy. 
For his part, Justice Breyer, in dissent, just mixes further vagueness 
into the discussion.  He suggests that a court can protect a public 
employee’s speech only if it “(1) involves a matter of public concern 
and also (2) takes place in the course of ordinary job-related duties,” 
and then the court also finds an “augmented need for constitutional 
protection and diminished risk of undue judicial interference with 
governmental management of the public’s affairs.”106  This language, 
which is vague and circular, also falls dramatically short of the lucid 
Tinker standard.  
The irony here is that, because public school teachers are 
themselves public employees, they now have fewer rights to object to 
school policy in an office memo than their own students theoretically 
have to object to it in a leaflet they bring to school.  A teacher can be 
reprimanded and disciplined for going through channels to register 
dissent about school policy, while a student cannot be retaliated 
against at all for speaking or writing against it.  The paradox flows out 
of the abandonment of Tinker’s elevation of democratic values over 
managerial ones.  While students have still not (entirely) shed their 
First Amendment rights at the schoolhouse gate, teachers mostly 
have.  
B. Soldiers at Work and Citizens on Base 
The weakness of speech protections for public employees is only 
compounded and magnified when the employees involved are 
members of our armed services.  One observer approvingly notes the 
consistent “judicial deference to government authorities” shown by 
the Supreme Court in military speech cases, an extreme deference 
that “has been justified on the grounds that the Constitution entrusts 
the regulation of the military to the Legislative and Executive 
branches.”107  Of course, this constitutional fact should be no more 
destructive of the free speech rights of soldiers than should the fact 
that the Constitution entrusts regulation of schools to state and local 
governments destroy the free speech claims of students.  Indeed, it is 
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one thing for society to fully entrust the management of a public 
function to a particular agency, quite another to entrust to it the 
simultaneous defense of constitutional liberties within.  
Indeed, this claim about essentially unreviewable institutional 
prerogatives is precisely the argument for complete deference to 
local school authorities and principals that Justice Frankfurter made 
unsuccessfully in dissent in West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette108 and Justice Black made unsuccessfully in dissent in Tinker.109  
Both arguments were rejected by the Court’s majority, which did not 
understand constitutional liberty to be a presumptive threat to 
bureaucratic efficiency.  In a democratic society, bureaucratic 
efficiency must be defined in a way that incorporates democratic 
liberty as public purposes are being implemented.  All of our social 
institutions may be derived from, and regulated by, legislative and 
executive power, but that fact does not displace the continuing force 
of the Bill of Rights.  Agencies implementing our laws do not judge 
their own cases and are not left to their own devices in protecting 
constitutional rights and values along the way.  It bears reminding:  
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is.”110   
Yet, Supreme Court jurisprudence has been so lopsided on soldier 
free speech claims that judicial review is in fact purely academic in 
this field.  As Captain John Carr notes, “the military may impose 
restrictions on the speech of military personnel whenever the speech 
poses a significant threat to discipline, morale, esprit de corps, or 
civilian supremacy.”111  That is, it can do so essentially whenever it 
wants.   
The vast doctrinal justifications for censorship leave our service 
members quite exposed indeed when it comes to their First 
Amendment rights.  To be sure, no one thinks that the First 
Amendment is completely irrelevant to military cases,112 but the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly found that it applies with extremely 
diluted force.   
                                                          
 108. 319 U.S. 624, 667–68 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 109. 393 U.S. 503, 523 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 110. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  
 111. Carr, supra note 107, at 306. 
 112. Even in Goldman v. Weinberger, which rejected a Jewish service member’s claim 
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Consider a leading case, Parker v. Levy,113 to see how a Tinker-
inflected standard would compare to the Court’s actual approach.  
Parker was an army captain and chief of dermatology at Fort Jackson 
in South Carolina, who made a number of statements critical of the 
Vietnam War to enlisted personnel at the Army hospital in the course 
of his work.114  The Army pressed charges, and he was convicted by a 
court-martial of violating three different Articles of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, including Article 133, which proscribes any 
“conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman,” and Article 134, 
which forbids “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good 
order and discipline” and “conduct of a nature to bring discredit 
upon the armed forces.”115  He was dismissed, subjected to forfeiture, 
and sentenced to three years of hard labor.116  The Third Circuit 
reversed his convictions on the grounds that these provisions were 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to his statements.117  Surely this is 
right: how could he reasonably have known that his anti-war 
statements would run afoul of the “officer and a gentleman” and 
“good order and discipline” clauses? 
But there is, of course, a more fundamental problem at work.  Even 
had notice been given, the Tinker standard suggests that the Army 
should not be able to punish him for making political statements 
about the Vietnam War unless the speech threatens a “substantial and 
material disruption” of the war effort, which was not alleged, or 
frustration of his specific assignment (successful operation of the 
dermatology service), which also was not alleged.  He cannot be 
punished simply for disagreeing with the government or the war or 
because his speech made superiors feel uncomfortable or vaguely 
apprehensive that it would somehow undermine military morale or 
the war effort. 
Yet, the Supreme Court, in a sweeping opinion by Justice 
Rehnquist, reversed and reinstated Parker’s criminal convictions, 
invoking the specialized nature of military life and its differences 
from civilian life and insisting upon the “different purposes of the 
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two communities.”118  While soldiers “enjoy many of the same rights” 
as civilians do, Justice Rehnquist argued, they do not possess “the 
same autonomy” because their “function is to carry out the policies” 
of their “civilian superiors.”119  Justice Rehnquist stated that the 
“different character of the military community and of the military 
mission,” rooted in the “fundamental necessity for obedience” and 
“necessity for imposition of discipline,” justifies the overriding of free 
speech rights within the military.120  In other words, the armed 
services must, at all times, be a total authoritarian institution where 
soldiers operate in a command system that excludes their identity as 
citizens of a constitutional democracy. 
In Greer v. Spock,121 this command-and-control paradigm even 
squelched the rights of civilians to make political connections to 
soldiers and to engage in political speech on military bases.  In that 
1976 case arising from the 1972 presidential election, People’s Party 
presidential candidate Dr. Benjamin Spock and his running mate 
Julius Hobson notified Fort Dix of their intention to enter the fifty-
five square mile army reservation to meet with service personnel and 
pass out campaign literature.122  They were denied permission to 
enter the base, even the public areas like roads and parks.123  Spock 
won injunctive relief from the Third Circuit, but the Supreme Court 
reversed, ruling that it is “‘the primary business of armies and navies 
to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise,’”124 and 
that “it is consequently the business of a military installation like Fort 
Dix to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum.”125 
This decision presupposes that a social institution, at least a 
military one, can have only one purpose and that all other purposes 
are, by definition, incompatible.  It would be as if the Tinker Court 
had decided that “the primary business of public education is to 
impart official curricular materials to students, and it is consequently 
the business of a school to train students, not to provide a public 
forum.”  This approach not only elevates the “management” function 
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 122. Id. at 832.  
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over “democracy,” in Post’s terms,126 but extinguishes democracy 
entirely from the picture, depriving citizens of their rightful portion 
of continuing democratic sovereignty.  As Justice Brennan says in 
dissent, the majority decision makes clear that “there is no longer 
room, under any circumstance, for the unapproved exercise of public 
expression on a military base.”127   
But why not?  The appearance of the world’s leading pediatrician 
and other anti-war activists on the base should be no more 
presumptively disruptive of military functioning than the appearance 
to speak of Members of Congress and other routine guests on 
military bases.  Even if uninvited guests appear to pass out literature 
in a common area or the sidewalk, all of the soldiers remain subject 
to their military duties and orders.  At the very least, Dr. Spock and 
company should be allowed on the public portions of the base to 
engage in political discussion until there is a real threat of material 
disruption of military preparedness and training.  An 
“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance”128 should 
never be enough to defeat the free speech rights of citizens and, in 
this case, acting on such fear looks like naked political censorship.  
The people who defend democracy with arms should be able to enjoy 
democracy unless the two goals become incompatible. 
However, we see that the Tinker standard has not touched the 
whole system of speech regulation in the armed services.  Soldiers, 
like public employees more generally, have fewer rights of expressive 
dissent than students do in school.  And citizens who seek to go on 
military bases in fact shed their First Amendment rights in the 
process.  
Of course, this brief, suggestive canvass barely scratches the surface 
of the repressive doctrines controlling expression in the public 
workplace and the military, much less other social institutions like the 
private workplace and the prison.  But the general point holds.  
Tinker remains the beacon of expressive freedom in institutional life 
and the most lucid and robust standard for protecting democratic 
liberty over the long haul against the incessant and totalizing claims 
of entrenched institutional power.  It is the freedom-centered 
reasoning of Tinker that holds promise for preventing the institutions 
that flow out of government from dissolving into partitioned and 
gated “enclaves of totalitarianism.”129  
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IV. DEMOCRATIC DISRUPTION AND THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS 
In public schools today, Tinker is as conceptually relevant as it ever 
was.  All across the country, schools are struggling with the proper 
treatment of irreverent student expression. Moreover, the advent of 
the Internet means that a whole new generation of issues has grown 
up around official efforts to punish off-campus student speech on 
web sites that gossip about student life or disparage school officials or 
teachers.130  In these cases, which have not made it to the Supreme 
Court yet, the lower courts seem clear that the only speech on 
students’ private web sites punishable by schools is that which 
threatens actual harm to other members of the community or 
otherwise substantially disrupts the educational process.131  Tinker thus 
not only makes schools internally safe for democratic freedom but 
provides the surest guidance to school officials on how to proceed in 
disentangling fair criticism and personal opinion uttered off campus 
from those true threats made to members of the learning community. 
Handled properly, the Internet age could usher in a new birth of 
student freedom of expression.  Given that web sites are radically free 
and off-limits to official control in all but the most extreme cases, 
shrewd officials might think twice before using their handy Hazelwood-
Fraser-Morse powers at school to censor student expression and drive it 
off campus into the wild world of cybertalk, where teachers, coaches, 
and school mentors have no sway at all.  It will benefit everyone if 
educators resist the urge to censor and instead engage students in 
serious intellectual and political dialogue at school, testing their 
youthful dogmas and probing their provisional certainties, teasing 
out their valuable and provocative insights, and helping them trim 
away that which is unfair, sleazy, or irresponsible.  This is the path of 
true education, which is to say the path of true freedom.  It is a path 
many schools have already chosen.  It is indeed the path of Tinker.  
The Tinker standard, of course, has two parts.  The student may not 
be punished for speech unless it threatens a “substantial disruption of 
or material interference with”132 the educational process or 
“impinge[s] upon the rights of other students.”133  The vitality of the 
standard depends upon the courts treating “substantial disruption” in 
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a serious and liberty-protective way.  Indeed, it was key to the Tinker 
decision itself that the Court saw Mary Beth’s black armband 
intervention into school discussion not as a disruptive threat to the 
educational process, but as a stimulating enrichment of it.  But much 
of the judicial controversy in interpreting and applying Tinker 
necessarily focuses on what is disruptive and what is not.  The “rights 
of others” prong has been mostly ignored or implicitly assimilated 
into the “disruption” analysis. 
But the future progress of the Tinker standard may turn on our 
capacity to shift emphasis and see how the rights of others should in 
fact be the principal object of our examination.  Mary Beth’s black 
armband did not threaten anyone else’s rights unless we make the 
mistake that her principal did by assuming that students (or people 
generally) have the right not to be offended or upset by someone 
else’s speech.  That is not a right that appears anywhere in the 
Constitution, and it is plainly not a right compatible with the First 
Amendment.  On the other hand, students do have a right under 
state and federal law to an education, so Mary Beth’s speech would 
lose its protection at the point at which it becomes so oppressive, 
discordant and pervasive that no one else can learn: an anti-war 
filibuster in French class or racist tirade in English would be good 
examples.  Short of that kind of showing, the right to speak must be 
integrated into the fabric of the educational process itself.  The 
Barnette and Tinker decisions instruct that this is not only an essential 
safeguard against social authoritarianism but the source of 
democratic renewal.   
Similarly, if we think about Ceballos’s memorandum, nothing in it 
remotely interfered with anyone else’s rights.  On the contrary, its 
whole purpose was to see that a criminal defendant’s constitutional 
rights were fairly enforced.  The rights of no one in the District 
Attorney’s office were threatened at all.  To be sure, his superiors had 
the right to reject his advice, as they did, and had no obligation to 
accept his perspective on things.  But controversy and disagreement 
are in the nature of policy discussion and contestation in the 
institutional life of a democratic society.  It is hard to see how 
Ceballos’s speech can become a lawful basis for discipline unless we 
treat the mysterious will of the bureaucracy itself as sacrosanct and 
unchallengeable. 
Even in the more difficult case of soldiers’ free speech in the 
military, a focus on the rights of others is fundamentally illuminating.  
When Dr. Parker expressed his deep scepticism about the Vietnam 
War at the military hospital, others might have disagreed with him or 
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even been offended by his position, but no one’s rights were violated 
in any way.  Perhaps the interests of the state were, in some distant 
and remote way, troubled by his anti-war activism, but if that is the 
constitutional basis for discipline, the state should have to make a far 
more compelling showing that there was an actual material and 
substantial disruption; the “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of 
disturbance” should never be enough to justify censorship and 
punishment of speech by citizens. 
In the final analysis, Tinker furnishes to us a provocative challenge 
and a standing invitation.  It challenges us to make the promise of 
democratic freedom real in all of society’s institutions, even those 
most determined to operate as “enclaves of totalitarianism.”  And it 
invites us to actually carve out space, at least in the interstices and 
margins of all of our social institutions, for citizens to speak and to 
hear one another, to engage in the unending and pervasive 
conversation that defines and constitutes political democracy. 
 
